who was involved in the battle of verdun

Post-1945: The Shift Towards a Shared Memory ↑ Might Verdun, the symbol of the greatest of wars, have been the best place to proclaim peace – even though it proved illusory? The sacred nature of Verdun explains why French veterans’ organizations chose the site in July 1936 for a spectacular ceremony: accompanied by German and Italian veterans, all pledged to defend the peace. Still, Verdun embodied a sort of endless nightmare. There, the Langemarck and Tannenberg crystalized heroic memory and the Somme constituted an even more murderous defensive battle. In Germany, Verdun could not claim the same monopoly over memory. As for the memory of the fighting, it was expressed through monuments on the battlefields that spoke to heroism at the “trench of the bayonets” (1920), and the more funerary ossuary initiated by Charles Ginisty (1864-1946) at Douaumont (1932). In 1929, it dedicated a monument to victory. In November 1916, the city of Verdun created a medal for soldiers who fought there. The city was decorated with both the cross of the Legion of Honour and the Croix de Guerre, as well as being honoured by many allied governments. The battle permeated popular culture, from textbooks to literature (one thinks of the writings of Henri Barbusse (1873-1935) and Roland Dorgelès (1885-1973)). In France, it served as a metaphor for the entire war and as a sacred memorial site. Verdun became a historical parabole on both sides. It was therefore the object of a shared representation of an unparalleled apocalypse, with the main feat having been for soldiers to go through this hell. The experience of combat was relatively similar on each side. At Verdun, under a deluge of artillery, the German soldier purportedly managed to maintain his unwavering will, and his sacrifice helped re-establish the national community ( Volksgemeinschaft). That is when a new interpretation took the upper hand in Germany, which runs as follows. A turning point can be discerned in the 1920s. Verdun was at this juncture not the subject of any specific German myth. However, this was an ex post facto reconstruction intended to mask the failure of an offensive that was actually intended to accelerate events along the Western Front. On the German side, Verdun was a battle of attrition which Erich von Falkenhayn (1861-1922) claimed to have conceived from the start as a deliberate bleeding dry of the French army. This discourse was accompanied by a glorification of the fighters at Verdun, as both martyrs and heroes. This choice, in turn, fuelled the existential myth of a German invasion and of a French resistance, encapsulated by Robert Nivelle’s (1856-1924) June 1916 phrase “they shall not pass.” The rotating door relief system implemented by Philippe Pétain (1856-1951) also made Verdun a national battle par excellence, one in which most French soldiers fought. On the French side, defending Verdun at all costs stemmed from a logic that was more political than military. Thus, a battle of attrition morphed into an epic struggle or into a fight for the very survival of the nation. But its memory, which was already taking shape in the heat of battle, and the tragic or triumphant narratives that emerged, provided the basis for subsequent reinterpretation. At first, it was simply conceived on the German side as the suppression of a bothersome protrusion in the front, while on the French side it was intended to remain a secondary battle. Combat conditions were terrible, but no worse than at Ypres or in the Aisne. It was a battle of materiel, yet it proved less murderous than the first months of the conflict. Verdun may have been a long battle, but it was not a decisive one.

Who was involved in the battle of verdun